Two leading Brazilian historians of the nineteenth century, Francisco Adolfo Varnhagen and João Francisco Lisboa, viewed Beckman's Revolt (I684-1685) in Maranhão as the first "natívíst" uprising against the basic concept of Portuguese colonial rule. In this study, I shall show that the revolt was brought about largely by local considerations. The rebels' single goal was to correct injustices forced upon their province as the result of a seríes of royal edicts from Lisbon, especially those dealing with the colonists' supply of Amerindian slave labor which had been entrusted to the resident J esuit missionaries. A further burden on Maranhão at the time of the revolt was a commercial monopoly (estanco) introduced into the province by the metropolitan government which had sought to avoid utilizing the royal treasury to foster economic development in a marginal overseas territory lacking profitable resources.
transportable and became important money-earners. For the economy of Maranhão to subsist, slaves were needed. But lacking capital to import Africans, as had been done in Bahia and Pernambuco, the Maranhenses sought to enslave the readily available Tupi Indians. However, their intention countered the catechistic objectives of the Portuguese Jesuits and Padre Vieira. The latter envisioned a Jesuit suzerainty over the Amerindians throughout a vast portion of the Brazilian North, from Maranhão to Pará and inland along the Amazon River and its tributaries. In the administrative unit of Grão-Pará e Maranhão (eventually including the preserit-day states of Amazonas and Ceará) which was ruled directly frorn Lisbon, Vieira wanted the indigenous population to be congregated into village missions, where both temporal and spiritual control would be exercised by the Society of Jesus. Consequently, the most accessible Amerindians were gatherd into reduções by the Ignacian fathers and thereby sheltered frorn the predatory white settlers of Maranhão.
During colonial Brazil's first two centuries Lisbon issued confusing and contradictory legislation concerning the Amerindians. As a result, disorder characterized relations between whites and Indians in Maranhão: "ora a liberdade ... ora o capt iveiro."! For example, a law in 1609 had declared ali Brazilian Indians free. Its wording was vague, however, and the royal representatives were unable, or often unwilling, to enforce its provisions. The loopholes in that law were such that Indian captives frorn inter-tribal warfare could be used as permanent indentured servants by the white settlers. The Amerindians could also be forced to labor if they received remuneration.?
Portuguese Iegislatio n between 1624 and 1686 reflected an ever-growing influence on the part of the Jesuit representatives in Lisbon concerning the protection of the Brazilian Indians. The first Jesuits had reached Maranhão between 1624 and 1626. In 1638 the first Indian red uctíons (aldeias) were entrusted to the Ignacian fathers. Finally, after years of influencing João IV, Padre Vieira himself arrived in São Luís in 1653 with a royal charter that provided the Jesuits with exclusive contrai over ali the Indians in Grão-Pará e Maranhão.
Padre Vi eira had earlier witnessed the terrible destruction of Amerindian villages in the Brazilian North during the founding of Grão-Pará e Maranhão. Enslavement, European diseases, and overwork had led to the decimation of the native population, He had computed the number of lndians in the captaincy prior to Portuguese settlement at more than a million, probably a slight overestimate, and had recognized some 500 substantial villages.:' Well aware that the municipal chamber of São Luís was pro-enslavement, the Jesuit leader urged the Society of Jesus in Maranhão to adopt a stance which would thwart such aggressiveness by the creoles. Understanding that the confusing legislation frorn metrapolitan Portugal had fostered considerable confusion and disorder in Maranhão, Vieira strove, through his intransigent attitude, to be a bastion in the defense of the Amerindians. ln his sermons to the people of São Luís, especially "O Sermão de Santo Antônio aos Peixes" (1654), Vieira chastized their attempt to bring civilization to the Ind ians by means of barbarities.
By 1655, because of mounting pressures frorn the settlers, the Jesuits felt obliged to loosen somewhat their strict hold on the labor supply. The creoles were given permission to organize Indi an-hunting slave parties (entradas) provided that a J esuit father accompanied each expedition. Any lndians taken captive were obliged to labor for the colonists, but only for a six-month period."
At the death of João IV in 1656, Afonso VI (1656-1668) carne to the throne in Lisbon. The deceased king, considering Padre Vieira his most cultured subject, had consistently lent him a ready ear. Behind Afonso, however, stood a palace faction which was wary of the J esuit leader's power. To dilute the J esuits' formidable role in Brazil, the new monarch opted to divide the Indian reduções of Grão-Pará e Maranhão among all the Lusitanian religious orders and gr ant the Indian chiefs temporal powers in their own villages. As a consequence, the municipal chambers of the province regained their preragative to force-draft Indian labor. Moreover in 1661, a sudden creole uprising in São Luís brought about the ternporary expulsion of the Jesuits from Maranhão. This small-scale mutiny had the tacit support of the resident governor, who was sympathetic to the grievances of the colonists. After their quick success, the local residents took the law into their own hands, and immediately descended on the de fenseless lndian reduções in order to fulfill their labor needs. The king, unable to punisch an entire province, was for the moment forced to acquiesce." Since the expulsion had involved only the Jesuits and not his own royal appointees, the monarch was able, without losing face, to disregard the Maranhenses' behavior. However, in 1668 a coup in Lisbon ousted Afonso VI. His successor, Pedra Il (1668-1705), thought highly of Padre Vieira, and the Jesuits soon regained their ínfluence. Reflecting the Socíety's renewed prestige, Portugal's Amerindian legislation of the seventeenth century culminated in an alvará (Aprill, 1680) which forced the creoles of Maranhão to return all Indians to Jesuit custody. This law specified that there would be no enslavement of the Indians; that the crown's magistrate (ouvidor] would be authorized to liberate all Indians held by any creole citizen; that, in warfare, Indian captives would be treated as prisoners of war and not enslaved; that Indians could labor for colonists only if their wages were deposited oeforehand with the governrnent; that the government in Lisbon would endeavor to import annually into Maranhão at least 500 African slaves to alleviate the labor crisis; that the Jesuits would retain both spiritual and temporal control over the Indians of Grão-Pará e Maranhão; and that only members of the Society of Jesus would be perrnitted to enter the sertão to seek Indians." Padre Vieira, however, was not deaf to the creoles' pleas for a labor supply in Brazil's primitive North. As early as 1661, he had sent a letter to the municipal chamber of Belém urging as an alternative the use of African slaves." Vieira reasoned that the African black, accustomed to slavery for centuries in Africa, should be utilized in Maranhão in place of the Indian. Thus, after the promulgation of the regulations of 1680, royal policy sought to stimulate the transporting of African slaves to Maranhão and the North. But only a negligible number actually reached the pravince:
Foram trazidos escravos negros por conta do erário real e distribuídos pelos moradores, que deveriam pagá-Ias dentro de três anos; mas não convinha tal sacrifício ao governo da metrópole, já a braços oom sérias dificuldades financeiras 8 Seventeenth-cen tury Portugal, heavily in debt and still recovering from its prolonged and fiscally ruinous conflicts with Holland and Spain, was unable to supply Maranhão with expcnsive A frican slaves. The colony was so poverty-stricken that íts tax base failed to cover the crown's expenses of local admíriistration. The govemment of Pedra II was obliged to place a speciallevy on commercial shipments from Portugal to Maranhão: "A real fazenda não devia suportar o desembolso, nem o risco, mormente tratando-se de longínquas colõnías.:" In reality, deficit-plagued Maranhão remained a perennial source of concern to Lisbon.
The mother country, however, through its improvised policies, had contributed to the constantly simmering anarchy in Maranhão. Minar revolts had been numerous since its founding in 1615. Simonsen lists upheavals in 1618, 1625, 1628, 1634, 1677, and 1680 as well as the first expulsion of the Jesuits in 1661, prior to Beckrnan's Revolt.!" The Lisbon governrnent centralized its ccntrol too tightly in Europe. The governors, and later "capitães-rnor"
(the capital of Grão-Pará e Maranhão was transferred from São Luís to Belém before Beckrnan's Revolt), who were sent frorn Portugal to São Luís, lacked the authority to make decísions in the interests of the colonists. During Beckman's uprising these renóis remained stubbornly loyal to Lisbon and had to be deposed by force.
11.The Commercial Company
Pedro II was finally able to transfer responsibility for Maranhão to a chartered venture, the "Companhia de Comércio do Maranhão e Grão-Pará," similar in makeup to a previous (and unsuccessful) Portuguese enterprise in Maranhão in the 1660's. Floated by a graup of Lisbon investors headed by Pedra Alves Caldas, Ii the Company's charter went into effect in 1682, and coincided with the arrival frorn Lisbon of a new governor, Francisco de Sá de Menezes, who was to implement its pravisions in Maranhão before taking up residence in Belém.
Accompanying the new governor was a stockholder, Pascoal Pereira Jansen, who was to serve as the Company's resident agent in São Luís and Belém. The historical reports are contradictory concerning the arrival of Sá de Menezes and J ansen. Meireles states that the people of Maranhão realized the potential damage the Company would cause and refused initially to allow Menezes and J ansen to disembark at São Luís in 1682? 2 Most other sources, however, imply that the people we1comed the two renôis with open arms. Unaware of the long-range potential consequences of the charter, they apparently believed that the Company would guarantee Maranhão's economic salvation. ln any case, _
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the new governor, through "temor, persuaçao, e suborno, conrorme as pessoas, overcame whatever immediate resistance there may have been in the captaincy. And J ansen, brandishing large sums of money, was able to bribe the more persistent skeptics among the upper classes.
The royal charter of 1682 granted the Company a twenty-year estanco, or monopoly, over the commerce of Grão-Pará e Maranhão. The import and export of all articles of trade was to be directly regulated by the Company, which would also sponso r and control one annual ship to Lisbon. Ali private trade with the exterior was prohibited and to guarantee compliance, the Company held powers of confíscation. Jansen published 2 tariff of the Cornpany's official prices which was to be adhered to by the colonists in all transactions. The entire produce of Grão-Pará e Maranhão was to be purchased by the Company at controlled prices. The Company was also pledgcd to import at least ten thousand African slaves at the rate of five hundred annually, and sold at a price dictated by the Company. It was further agreed that the shareholders in Lisbon would send specialists to Grão-Pará e Maranhão to stimulate the cultivation of cacau and vanilla.!" Yet another contradiction in Lisbon's Indian policy emerged: although lndian slavery had been abolished, the Company was authorized the free use of as many as one hundred Tupi married couples in each urban center of Grão-Pará e Maranhão in order to grow food for the awaited African slaves. And, under the charter, the governor himself was unable to interfere with the Company, and civil ar criminal suits against it were to be heard only by a special court in Lísbon. ' 5 When the promised slaves did not arrive during the next two years, a wave of complaints arose frorn the anguished residents.' 6 The J esuits adamantly refused to lend lndians to ease the creoles' acute labor shortage. Further enraging the colonists was the fact that the Ignacian fathers were exempt frorn the Company's strict contrais. The royal governor maintained the restrictions against Indian-hunting expeditions by non-Jesuits.
According to Meireles, the Company employed false weights and measures, brought textiles of inferior quality frorn Lisbon, and its promised annual cargo ship failed to adhere to a schedule.' 7 The Company's Indian servants, in addition, milled farinha and undersold local producers, thus driving the latter into desperate straits.I" Salt and wine, already luxuries, became even more scarce.
Rumors of cor ruption among the local royal officials spread throughout Grão-Pará e Maranhão. Although by law the governors were prahibited from participating in trade or earning additional income while serving in the Portuguese overseas colonies, Sá de Menezes was reputed to have forced his own shipment of clove onto a Company vessel, thereby causing the removal of shípments belonging to private residents.l " Hélio Viana notes that J ansen secretly maintained his own private business, and raised the prices of the few slaves who did arrive from Africa. 2 0Bishop Dom Gregório dos Anjos, apparently in collusion with the Company, was accused of utilizing Indian slaves on a private c1ove-gathering expedítíon."! But while he may have reaped handsome personal profits, Gregório dos Anjos appears also to have tacitly opposed the Company. Jealous of the J esuits' omnipotence, the local bishop feared that the estanco would irrevocably fortify the Society's power. The resident clergy, many of whom were creoles who identified more with the colonists' than with Lisbon's interests, openly opposed the monopoly. The pulpits of São Luís seethed with denunciations of Jansen and his Cornpany ; one sermon even portrayed the stockholders of the Company as the new Pharísees.? 2 On the eve of Beckman's revolt, another sermon delivered by a respectable local priest, probably with the bishop's knowledge, declared that the remedy for the abuses frorn Portugal was in the hands of the Maranhenses themselves.? 3 Other orders, especially the Carmelites and Franciscans, tried to check the Jesuits' prestige and power by siding with the colonists against the commercial Company. The Capuchins, in fact, allowed their convent to be used as a meeting pl ace by Beckman and his conspirators.
III. Beckman and his past
Manuel Beckman ("reinol de origem teutõníca"?"}, also referred to as "Bequimão" and "Beckeman" was a prosperous small-scale sugar planter, who owned the Verá-Cruz plantation on the Mearim River, then a two-or three-day canoe trip from São Luís. Bom in Lisbon of a German father and a Portuguese mother, he settled in Maranhão in 1662. 25 A possibly Jewish background may have motivated his departure. Through his industriousness he gained acceptance to the upper class of Maranhão, and in 1669 became a councilman (vereador) of the municipal chamber of São Luís.
However, in the 1670's he appears to have run afoul of the colonial authorities by opposing the then governor of Pará, Inácio Coelho, who had chosen a half-breed (mameluco) to be "capitão-mor" in Maranhão. After retaliatory legal proceedings, "marked with the odious irregu1arities and injustices of despotism.T'" Governor Coelho banished Beckman to Gurupá, a village on the Amazon River in distant Pará. From his exile in Gurupá, Beckman sent to Pedro 11 an eleven-page 1etter of appeal dated June 13, 1679. In it he systematically refuted Governor Coelho's charges that he had been an agitator and a muerderer, and begged for clemency.ê ? The appeal was apparent1y successful since Beckman was permitted to return to Maranhão in 1680,28 after two years of exile." 9 The kíng also recommended that Pará choose a different "capitão-mor" for Maranhão.
Beckman's sense of injustice was further engrained when he reached Mearim to find his fazenda in ruin from years of neglect. His resentment and bitterness increased his antipathy toward the crown's policies. The continued dornination of the Indians by the Jesuits and the tyranny of the chartered Company eventually led him to plan the revolt of 1684:
Revoltado com a injustiça que sofrera, fez causa comum com os descontentes, mesmo porque reconheceu impossível reestabelecer, nas condições atuais, o seu engenho, "VeIa-Cruz," no Mearim. 30 He became chief of the conspirators "pela superioridade de ânimo de que já dera prova.v" ' Beckman was also encouraged by the knowledge that the Maranhenses who had been involved in the first expulsion of the J esuits in 1661 had escaped punishment. On that occasion even the roya! governor had tacitly abetted the ouster. In 1685, however, Beckman did suffer capital punishment sínce he had begun his revolt by deposing the kíng's representative and the peninsular bureau-crats.
Among the historians who have analyzed this uprising, Southey states that Beckman entertained the fantastic notion that the Portuguese pirate Dom João de Lima, then operating off the Brazilian coast, would come to the aid of Maranhão.P The Jesuit historian, Serafim Leite, is critica! of Varnhagen and João Francisco Lisboa, who interpreted the events of 1684 and 1685 as an heroic first "nativíst" revolt against Portuguese colonial rule.:' 3 Berredo published the first history of the revolt in 1746. He had obtained most of his material from a manuscript by a contemporary observer, Francisco Teixeira de Morais, who, as an official of the royal treasury in Maranhão, was clear1y unfair to Beckman.ê " In his study, Berredo sought to compensate by depicting Beckman more obj ectively. The J esui t chronicler, Padre João Betendo rf, anot her eyewitness, portrayed the rebel leader as an incarnation of the devil but allowed traces of sympathy for Beckman and his cause to surface at times. 35 Secondary sources list some additional participants in the revolt. Among them were Beckrnan's younger brother Tomás, a lawyer and talented writer of political satires, who was belatedly dispatched to Lisbon to plead the rebels' cause. The most colorful figure, however, was a militant anti-J esuit, Jorge de Sarnpaio, a legal scribe who was in his seventies by 1684. As early as 1653 when a group of Ignacíans arrived in São Luís, Sampaio publicly insulted the disembarking missionaries and exhorted the residents of São Luís to expell thern.I" ln 1663 Sampaio had journeyed to Lisbon on behalf of the municipal chamber of São Luís to request Afonso VI's permission for that body to sponsor its own lndian-hunting entradas. A popular priest, Frei lnácio, of the Nossa Senhora do Carmo Church in São Luís, another active participant, used his pulpit to urge the Maranhenses to open revolt.
IV. The RevoIt
The revolt began in São Luís on the night of February 24,1684. The conspirators, who had held numeraus meetings, gathered in the São Antônio Convent for final plans. Although the less courageous participants at first balked at the idea of forcibly deposíng the royal "capitão-mor," Beckman and his followers proceeded into the streets in the dark, where they mingled with a passing religious procession. After months of urging fram the pulpits.:' 7 which functioned as the newspapers of that era, the rebellion was finally under way.
The immediate goals -the arrest of the "capitão-mor," Baltazar Fernandesthe seizure of the offices and warehouses of the Company, and the house arrest of the Jesuits -were accomplished by dawn. The only resistance was from minor peninsular authorities, such as the royar treasurer, Teixeira de Morais.i' " ln the morning a three-member junta, consisting of Beckman, a priest and a peasant (Eiró), was constituted. This act gave a democratic hue to the creole uprising, since the upper class (nobres), the local clergy, which had played an active role in the planning;"" and the lower class (povo) were represented. The junta convoked a militia to replace the king's soldíers who were for the most part deemed untrustworthy.Recalcitrant royal bureaucrats were jailed or banished by the junta. The takeover appears to have been accomplished without much violence. Only Southey mentions deaths resulting from the rebellíon."" Beckman's cohorts were elated at their immediate success. Under the rallyng cry of "slaves for everyone," he and his followers had swept into power. The motto was especially effective since it could be directed at the J esui ts, who had monopolized the lndians, as well as the Company, which had Iaíled to deliver the promised African laborers.
The revolt, which João Lúcio de Azevedo has descríbed as nothing more than a "motim de aldeia, ,,4 I soon lost momentum. Beckrnan journeyed across the bay from São Luís to Alcântara to seek support and sent a message to Belém requesting an alliance. In both cases, he was quickly rebuffed, since neither municipal chamber saw any potential benefit in an alliance with São Luís. Moreover, the governor at Belém , Sá de Menezes, had a royal militia garrison at his command. Furthermore, the leaders of Pará, believing in the basic fairness of the monarch when properly inforrned, had previously decided to send a petition to Lisbon outlining their specific local grievances.
When the Jesuits in São Luís were informed of their imminent expulsion, they adopted a strategy of conciliation and obeyed the junta's orders to remain inside their convent. They volunteered to surrender their temporal jurisdiction over the Indians, and insisted publícly, according to Betendorf, that they had never wished to be burdened with that extra duty."? Betendorf, an eyewitness to these events, transcribed the meeting between Beckrnan and the Jesuit superior a few days after the revolt, noting the rebel leader's palite tone, but portraying him as a diabolic figure.":' Betendorf himself personal1y warned him of the king's impending wrath."" Beckman soon discovered that the Jesuit proposals to relinquish control over the Indians had been received favorably by the rebels. He immediately drafted and presented a speech, transcribed by Betendorf.t" in which he reminded the Maranhenses of the past treacheries perpetrated against them by the Society of Jesus, and blamed it for the colony's ills. At the same time, the junta set the date of the Jesuits' banishment for Palm Sunday (March 26, 1684) . Although the creole revolt accomplished its primary goals, the self-imposed isolation from Lisbon compounded the province's deprivation.
V. The 8reakdown of the Uprising 8eckman's movement crumbled within the next few weeks. After Pará's denial of support, the more perceptive adherents in São Luís realized that their cause was lost. There had always been a rivalry between São Luís and 8elém, and the latter "estranhou as demasias a que se arrojara o povo de São Luís.,,46 The governor and bishop of 8elém labored to keep the rebels of São Luís ísolated. The creoles of Maranhão soon became disenchanted with Beckrnan and his immediate followers. The rebel governrnent lacked authority, there was no improvement in the material life of Maranhão, and communications with the outside were eliminated.
The unexpected arrival at São Luís of two Company ships with a seant cargo of two hundred African slaves resul ted in a further loss of prestige for Beckman. Since he had to opt for a lottery to distribute the slaves, Beckrnan was ímmediately accused of favoritism by those who drew blanks. He caused further consternation by demanding that the Company be reimbursed for the slaves per contract. When Sá de Menezes sent a representative form Belém to bribe Beckman, the latter's refusal and the public exposure of the attempt did raise his popularity for a short period.
João Francisco Lisboa and other historians were unable to ascertain the reasons for the continued delay in dispatching Tomás Backman to plead the rebels' cause in the mother country."? João Francisco Lisboa theorizes, however, that Beckman hírnself stalled, still hoping for an alliance with Pará. Southey and rewards were placed on the heads of Beckman and Eiró, who was the people's representative on the junta. Beckman was seized at his Vera-Cruz property severa! months later and, promising not to escape, went honorably to São Luís. He was seemingly eager for punishment: "a própria vítima parecia oferecer-se quase voluntária. "S 3 He and Sampaio were judged and hanged within a month (November 2, 1685). Eiró was a fugitive in the interior for rnany years until his pardon, The "menos culpados," such as Tomás Beckrnan, were exiled for short periods. Beckrnan was soon vindicated, however, as Gomes Freire, after consuIting with Pará and Lisbon, abolished the estanco, and Maranhão returned to its former practice of free and open trade.
VII. Conclusions
The revolt, loca! in scope, was hastily organized, having neither plan nor doctrine. It did not question the basic relationship of tl.e colonists vis-à-vis the metropolís. There was no serious attempt to challenge Pedro Il's control, or even the slightest hint of bringing about a republic. No documents were unearthed to indicate that Maranhão intended to alIy itself with a power hostile to Portugal. And those punished died "protestando seu arrependimento e beijando a mão que os punia".54
The obvious grievance, symbolized by Tomás Beckman's mission to Lisbon, was that the Maranhenses were unjustly treated by a coalition of resident royal bureaucrats, the Jesuit missionaries, and the commerical Cornpany. It was believed that the king, when properly inforrned by Tomás Beckman of the wrongs perpetrated against the colonists of Maranhão, would redress those grievances.
When confronted
with Beckman's rebellion, however, Lisbon held alI the advantages. Since the rebels were effectively isolated within their own province, the monarch could simply wait for them to grow weary. After quelling the revolt, the king and Gomes Freire tacfulIy avoided alienating the colonists. Only the upper echelon leaders were punished while the clergy involved in the uprising were fully pardoned. After the principIe of royal authority had been reestablished, the revolt was soon vindicated through certain reforrns, such as the eventual abolition of the estanco, "que nem aos próprios interessados dera resultado ".55
After the revolt was put down, the Society of Jesus returned to Maranhão with the intention of increasing its authority. However, the crown gradua!ly began to apply pressure on the Jesuits. For instance, other religious orders in Grão-Pará e Maranhão were soon given a share of the Indian missions. With the causes of Beckman's uprising stilI vivid in their minds, the crown and the Jesuits were more receptive to the colonists' labor dem ands on the Amerindians. The Society of Jesus never regaíned the authority it had had in Maranhão before the events of 1684-1685.
Beckman's revolt was the clímax of more than half a century of problems and extreme hardship for the colonists in peripheral Maranhão, The collapse of the revolt was a harsh lessem. After 1685 they continued to pursue their goa! of an availabJe labor suppJy, but now without vioJence. Only a century later would Brazilians begin to question seriousJy their centuries-old ties to Portugal.
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